

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 168614
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/SE:GWCHAPMAN:LB
APPROVED BY EUR/SE:RCEWING
EUR/CAN:CJCLEMENT
S/S:DANDERSON
EUR:MPARRIS
S:AHOUGHTON

-----014479 040200Z /61

R 032304Z JUL 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 168614

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY

SUBJECT: CANADIAN MINEXTAFF JAMIESON'S LETTER TO SECRETARY
ON CYPRUS

1. FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, IS TEXT OF LETTER ON
CYPRUS SITUATION THAT SECRETARY RECEIVED FROM JAMIESON ON
JUNE 30: BEGIN TEXT:

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„ DEAR CY, I HAVE NOW RETURNED FROM MY VISITS TO TURKEY
AND CYPRUS. DURING THOSE VISITS I WAS EXPOSED TO A WIDE
RANGE OF OPINIONS. AS PROMISED, I SHALL TRY TO GIVE YOU A
SUMMARY OF MY IMPRESSIONS ABOUT WHERE WE ARE IN RESPECT OF
THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.

3. I AM CLEAR IN MY MIND THAT NOTHING IS LIKELY TO MOVE

UNTIL THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST TURKEY HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. I CANNOT SAY WHETHER, OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, KYPRIANOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS RESUMED. THE TURKISH PROPOSALS CLEARLY GIVE HIM VERY LITTLE INCENTIVE TO SHOW HIMSELF ACCOMMODATING. BUT WITH THE EMBARGO IN PLAY, HE SEEMS TO FEEL THAT HE CANNOT BECOME AN ACCOMPLICE TO HAVING IT LIFTED EVEN IF HE WERE NOT CONVINCED, AS HE IS, THAT ITS REMOVAL WOULD END WHATEVER FLEXIBILITY THERE MAY STILL BE IN THE TURKISH POSITION.

4. THE EMBARGO IS, THEREFORE, A COMPLICATING FACTOR. BUT MY OVERRIDING IMPRESSION IS THAT, EMBARGO OR NO EMBARGO, THE STATUS QUO IS FAR FROM BEING INTOLERABLE FOR EITHER COMMUNITY ON THE ISLAND. IT IS TRUE THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE LOST TERRITORY AND THAT THEY ARE SADDLED WITH A REFUGEE PROBLEM OF SORTS. BUT THEY HAVE DONE A FAIR JOB OF ABSORBING THE REFUGEES; THEIR ECONOMY IS QUITE VISIBLY BOOMING; AND THEY HAVE WHAT THEY PROBABLY PRIZE ABOVE ALL ELSE, WHICH IS A MONOPOLY OF LEGITIMACY. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS, ON THEIR SIDE, HAVE MORE TERRITORY THAN ANY REASONABLE CLAIM IS LIKELY TO SUPPORT AND THEY HAVE THE SECURITY AFFORDED TO THEM BY TURKISH TROOPS.

5. I DO NOT WANT TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS NO REAL INTEREST ON EITHER SIDE IN NEGOTIATING A SOLUTION. THAT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE TO OVERSTATE THE CASE. BUT I AM STRONGLY CONFIDENTIAL

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PERSUADED THAT, SHORT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MAXIMUM CLAIMS, WHICH THEY MUST KNOW IN THEIR HEART OF HEARTS TO BE UNREALISTIC, NEITHER SIDE SEES A SETTLEMENT AS BEING LIKELY TO BRING ABOUT A MEASURABLE IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS.

6. AND YET THE ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION SEEM TO ME TO BE AT HAND. THE CONCEPT OF A BIZONAL, BICOMMUNAL FEDERATION IS CENTRAL TO IT. WHAT REMAINS TO BE RESOLVED IS HOW MUCH TERRITORY EACH COMMUNITY IS TO BE ALLOTTED AND HOW WEAK OR HOW STRONG THE FEDERAL LINKS CAN BE MADE. I SUSPECT THAT THE MAJOR GREEK CYPRIOT INTEREST IS ON THE TERRITORIAL SIDE OF THE EQUATION. THAT IS WHERE THE TURKISH POSITION IS WEAKEST AND ALTHOUGH ECEVIT DID NOT EXCLUDE SOME FURTHER FLEXIBILITY, INCLUDING IN THE VAROSHA SECTOR ABOUT WHICH YOU WROTE TO ME, HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IN OVERALL TERMS, IT WOULD BE WITHIN FAIRLY NARROW LIMITS. ON THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS ARE SEEN AS AMOUNTING TO DE FACTO PARTITION AND I CAN SEE THE DIFFICULTY OF HOLDING A FEDERATION TOGETHER OVER TIME ON SUCH A FRAGILE BASIS. THE ANSWER MAY BE TO BUILD SOME MOVEMENT INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE FEDERAL

LINKS AND INSTITUTIONS TO BE STRENGTHENED AS THE TURKS GAIN
CONFIDENCE IN THE WORKINGS OF THE FEDERAL SCHEME.

7. BUT THE PARTIES ARE NOT GOING TO COME TO ANY SUCH AR-
RANGEMENT ON THEIR OWN. AS I SAY, THE INCENTIVES DO NOT
SEEM TO ME TO BE SUFFICIENT FOR THAT. I AM ALSO CONCERNED
THAT THE PRESENT INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, EVEN IF THEY WERE TO
BE RESUMED, ARE TOO INTERMITTENT TO ALLOW ANY MOMENTUM TO
BE BUILT UP TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. I BELIEVE THAT SOMETHING
ALONG THE LINES OF YOUR OWN 1967 MISSION OR OUR GOOD OFFICES
EXERCISE IN RESPECT OF NAMIBIA WOULD REPRESENT A MUCH MORE

PROMISING APPROACH. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE SHALL NEED TO
INVOLVE GREECE AND TURKEY MORE CLOSELY IN THE SUCCESSFUL
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OUTCOME OF THE TALKS BECAUSE, IN THE END, OUR LEVERAGE ON
THEM IS LIKELY TO BE GREATER THAN ANY LEVERAGE WE HAVE ON
THE COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS.

8. MAY I SAY THAT THE UN TROOPS ARE DOING A FIRST RATE JOB
ON THE ISLAND. FROM THE BRIEFING I RECEIVED FROM GENERAL
QUINN AND FROM THE COMMANDER OF OUR OWN CONTINGENT, I AM
NOT SURE THAT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF ROOM FOR RESTRUC-
TURING THE UN FORCE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OR THAT RE-
STRUCTURING WOULD, IN FACT, SAVE THE UN ANY SUBSTANTIAL
RESOURCES. I MADE IT CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED ON THE ISLAND
THAT THERE COULD BE NO EXPECTATION OF CANADIAN TROOPS RE-
MAINING IN CYPRUS FOREVER, THAT AFTER FOURTEEN YEARS OF DE-
PLOYMENT THERE WERE CANADIANS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT WHO
FELT WE WERE BECOMING PART OF THE PROBLEM INSTEAD OF BEING
PART OF THE SOLUTION, AND THAT OTHER PEACEKEEPING DEMANDS
LOOMING ON THE HORIZON ELSEWHERE MIGHT WELL NECESSITATE
OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM UNFICYP THOUGH A DECISION TO WITHDRAW
WOULD NOT BE TAKEN UNILATERALLY OR WITHOUT NOTICE.

9. THESE ARE, IN SUM, THE MAIN IMPRESSIONS I HAVE CARRIED
AWAY FROM MY VISIT TO CYPRUS AND FROM MY CONVERSATIONS WITH
ECEVIT AND OKCUN IN ANKARA. GIVEN THE DISRUPTIVE IMPACT
THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS HAVING ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE
NATO ALLIANCE, I AM MORE PERSUADED THAN EVER THAT WE CAN-
NOT SIMPLY ALLOW THE PROBLEM TO FESTER ON. I HOPE THAT
THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR US, WHEN WE NEXT MEET,
TO HAVE A FURTHER WORD AS TO WHAT CAN BE DONE. YOURS
SINCERELY, DON JAMIESON. END TEXT.

10. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY'S RESPONSE OF JULY 3
WHICH YOU SHOULD DELIVER TO JAMIESON. SIGNED ORIGINAL IS
BEING POUCHED.

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11. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR DON: THANKS EVER SO MUCH FOR YOUR VERY HELPFUL NOTE ON YOUR RECENT VISIT TO TURKEY AND CYPRUS. I AGREE THAT AS SOON AS WE GET THROUGH THE EM-BARGO VOTE WE OUGHT TO BEGIN TO DEVELOP A SPECIFIC APPROACH TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. I LEAN TOWARD SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE CONTACT GROUP EFFORTS. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS WITH YOU AT THE BONN SUMMIT.

12. WARMEST REGARDS, SINCERELY, CY. END TEXT. VANCE

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PAGE 01 STATE 168614
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:PBSWIERS

APPROVED BY EUR:MPARRIS

EUR/SE:GCHAPMAN

S/S-0:JETOBIN

-----051471 080000Z /61

R 071835Z JUL 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USNATO 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 168614

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 168614 ACTION NICOSIA INFO ANKARA
ATHENS USUN BONN PARIS LONDON OTTAWA JULY 3.

QUOTE O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 168614

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PLOYMENT THERE WERE CANADIANS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT WHO FELT WE WERE BECOMING PART OF THE PROBLEM INSTEAD OF BEING PART OF THE SOLUTION, AND THAT OTHER PEACEKEEPING DEMANDS LOOMING ON THE HORIZON ELSEWHERE MIGHT WELL NECESSITATE OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM UNFICYP THOUGH A DECISION TO WITHDRAW WOULD NOT BE TAKEN UNILATERALLY OR WITHOUT NOTICE.

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12. WARMEST REGARDS, , SINCERLY, CY. END TEXT. VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

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Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
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Concepts: DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS
Control Number: n/a
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Draft Date: 03 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Disposition Reason:
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Executive Order: GS
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Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
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Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2123785
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CANADIAN MINEXTAFF JAMIESON'S LETTER TO SECRETARY ON CYPRUS
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, PDEV, PSDC, CA, US, CY, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (JAMIESON, DONALD),
To: NICOSIA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3dc37c7b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
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